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Peer-Reviewed Article December 30, 2020

Evolutionary game analysis on the selection of green and low carbon innovation between manufacturing enterprises

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Published in: Alexandria Engineering Journal
Publisher: Elsevier BV • Egypt • 1110-0168
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aej.2020.12.015

Abstract

Focusing on the selection of green and low carbon (GLC) innovation, this paper builds an evolutionary game between manufacturing enterprises, and another model between an enterprise and the government. Based on the models, the dynamic evolution of the selection process was analyzed in details. The results show that the game between manufacturing enterprises will eventually converge, due to the cost advantage of some enterprises in traditional innovation and the spillover effect of GLC innovation results. Some enterprise will choose GLC innovation, but some will adhere to traditional innovation, while sharing part of the revenue of GLC innovation of others. After government intervention, the innovation behaviors of manufacturing enterprises will be compensated for, rewarded, or penalized by means of transfer payment, tax credit, etc. As a result, all enterprises will eventually switch to GLC innovation.

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