Briefing: The crisis in South Sudan
Abstract
On 16 December 2013 the President of the Republic of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, appeared on state television in military uniform to announce that he had successfully put down a coup attempt in the capital, Juba. The coup attempt was said to have been led by former Vice-President Riek Machar and several ex-cabinet ministers and officials of the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), including Madame Rebecca Nyanding de Mabior, the widow of the SPLM's first leader, John Garang. Eleven alleged coup plotters were arrested in their homes, but Riek Machar escaped from Juba, and, amid reports over the next few days of targeted killings of Nuer in Juba by men in uniform loyal to the President, the commanders of the 8th and 4th army divisions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Jonglei and Unity states announced their defection to Riek Machar and seized control of the state capitals of Bor and Bentiu. In telephone interviews from secure places Riek Machar denied that he had been involved in a coup but then urged the army to overthrow Salva Kiir and announced his plans to march on Juba. Despite the fact that the arrested ministers came from a variety of communities across South Sudan, Western media reports cast the political struggle exclusively in tribal terms, of Salva Kiir's Dinka against Riek Machar's Nuer. The targeted killings in Juba and revenge killings of Dinka by Nuer in Akobo and Bor in Jonglei state seemed to bear this out. The coup was said to have begun with a fight between Nuer and Dinka soldiers in the presidential guard following a meeting of the SPLM's National Liberation Council (NLC), which Riek Machar and the alleged plotters had boycotted, and in which Salva Kiir had denounced Riek in strident terms. Yet while the government of South Sudan has kept to this version of events, they have presented little concrete evidence to support their claim of a plot, and few friendly governments have accepted it unequivocally. Instead there was strong international pressure for the release of the eleven detainees. During the next month see-saw battles were fought over the control of Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal (the capitals of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states), as well as the oil fields in Unity. The oil companies shut down their installations in Unity and withdrew their staff. While the forces said to be loyal to Riek Machar were drawn mainly from defecting garrisons in the three states and some armed civilian Nuer groups from Jonglei, the government received military support from Uganda, as well as the SPLA-North and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) forces in rebellion against Khartoum in neighbouring Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. International pressure on both the government and dissidents resulted in an IGAD-brokered cessation of hostilities agreement in Addis Ababa on 23 January, but this proved to be an agreement on paper only with no immediate provision for monitoring on the ground. By the beginning of February nearly 750,000 persons were estimated to have been displaced by the fighting in Juba and the three states; 85,200 were seeking refuge in the compounds of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS); and over 130,000 were estimated to have fled into neighbouring countries, including Sudan.1 Estimates of deaths have varied wildly from 1,000 to 100,000. A new rotation of fly-in-fly-out journalists focused on Juba for the first few weeks of the conflict and soon produced their own narrative, derived mainly from interviews with harassed expatriates from the Western embassies, UNMISS and NGOs. South Sudan is too ethnically divided to be a sustainable nation, the narrative ran. It became independent too early, and this was largely the fault of the US government and Hollywood stars such as George Clooney. This was first stated by Daniel Howden in The Observer2 but has been recycled by others, most disappointingly in a blog posted by the Royal African Society's own director, Richard Dowden.3 Such analysis is based on two significant simplifications. The first is the assumption that the Nuer and the Dinka each are single corporate “tribes”, capable of mass mobilization. They are no more tribes than the Irish or the Scots are, and representatives of each people will be found on all sides of a political argument, as they are today. The second is to reduce twenty-two years of civil war and six years of political contestation to the final years leading up to the self-determination referendum, denying South Sudanese their own agency and shifting the focus to external actors as the prime motivators. It was Salva Kiir who inserted the self-determination clause in the initial framework agreement in 2002, and it was the US special envoy, Senator Danforth, who opposed it.4 What, then, is really happening in South Sudan? In brief, two parallel conflicts that have been developing since 2005 have now converged, one in the governing party, the SPLM, and one in the army, the SPLA. Both have their origins in unresolved tensions following the split in the SPLA in the 1990s, and the incomplete reintegration of anti-SPLA forces into the SPLA after 2005. This briefing seeks to explain the roots of the crisis, focusing first on divisions within the governing party, before turning to the issues of military integration and the challenges for future peace and stability. There has been an internal debate about party direction at least since the death of John Garang in 2005, shortly after signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and being sworn in as Sudan's first Vice-President and President of the government of South Sudan. He was replaced by his deputy in the SPLM hierarchy, Salva Kiir Mayardit, a career soldier rather than a politician, and much of the debate about party direction has focused on Salva Kiir's performance as President of South Sudan both during the interim period of 2005–11 and since independence in 2011. Garang was the architect of the party's ‘New Sudan’ platform, which envisaged a reformed and restructured Sudan, and explains why the SPLM was able to expand the war beyond the southern Sudan and recruit heavily in the ‘northern’ states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan. Self-determination for South Sudan alone was an alternative included in the peace agreement should the New Sudan prove unachievable during the six-year interim period stipulated in the CPA. With Salva Kiir's elevation to the presidency the New Sudan project was effectively abandoned – given lip service only – as the SPLM's primary goal. Dr Peter Adwok Nyaba, a former Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology, and later accused of being a coup plotter, recorded much of the internal debate in a book published in the year of South Sudan's independence.5 In his critique of the lost opportunities during the Interim Period, Adwok Nyaba highlighted the eclipse of Garang's strongest supporters within the party and their replacement by a circle of close advisers and confidants drawn mainly from Salva Kiir's own community around Gogrial, some not even members of the SPLM, and others with suspiciously close ties to the National Congress Party (NCP) regime in Khartoum. It was the influence of this circle, according to Adwok Nyaba, that weakened the government of South Sudan's negotiating position with the NCP over the implementation of the CPA. Though many of the SPLM stalwarts were later reinstated, there were still complaints within the party and within the government generally of the presidential entourage restricting access to the President. Within this period, Adwok Nyaba alleged, no mechanisms of accountability were established within the government or the army, partly because of the continued rift between the President and the Garang loyalists, but also because Vice-President Riek Machar followed his own agenda. Adwok Nyaba concluded by calling for the SPLM to renew its original commitment to the concepts of social justice, equality, democracy, and progress through a new constitutional arrangement for the nation.6 After independence criticism of Salva Kiir was further stimulated by speculation over whether he would run for re-election in 2015, and, if not, who would be his successor. Many within the SPLM agreed with Adwok Nyaba that the party had lost direction since the independence referendum and had no real vision or programme for national development and national unity. This uncertainty encouraged a number of potential candidates, not so much to throw their hats in the ring, as to look for hats ready to throw. These included the party's long-standing secretary general, Pagan Amum, Foreign Minister Nhial Deng Nhial, and the Speaker of the National Assembly James Wani Igga. Riek Machar had already made clear his ambition to succeed as President, having argued for strict presidential term limits to be included in the interim constitution. There was a vigorous and open debate about these issues, both within the party and externally, throughout the first half of 2013, but that debate was shut down in July when Salva Kiir dismissed his entire cabinet and brought in people from outside the party to replace them. This move was accompanied by a more vigorous suppression of public debate through the harassment of journalists and newspapers by the state security. The most widely discussed dismissals were those of Riek Machar as Vice-President and Pagan Amum as secretary general of the party. The position of Vice-President is an appointed, not elective post, and tensions between the President and Vice-President were public knowledge. Riek had been busy endorsing any cause that might gain him popularity, and somewhat belatedly crafted a top-down national reconciliation campaign. He had also announced his intention of standing against Salva Kiir for both the party chairmanship and presidency, but had seen no apparent contradiction in remaining Vice-President while so publicly challenging the sitting President. Pagan Amum had been the government's lead negotiator over post-independence issues with Khartoum as well as SPLM secretary general. His dismissal was accompanied by a gagging order not to talk to the media and not to leave Juba. The wholesale dismissal of the cabinet was at first received reasonably favourably in Juba, as many of those dismissed were perceived to be incompetent or corrupt. But the announcement of the replacement cabinet brought no reassurance that it was going to be the promised government of technocrats. Aleu Ayeny Aleu, the new Interior Minister, had frequently denounced the media for criticizing the President. Michael Makuei Lueth, the new Minister for Information, was also seen as responsible for watering down the media laws and sections of the transitional constitution dealing with the press. Others were seen as too close to Khartoum: Dr Riak Gai Kok, a Nuer and the new Minister for Health, was the leader of the NCP in the South between 2005 and 2011. Abdallah Deng Nhial, the new Minister of the Environment and a Dinka from the president's own Gogrial area, had been Hassan al-Turabi's Popular Congress Party's presidential candidate in 2010. Telar Ring Deng, rejected by the National Assembly as Minister of Justice, was retained as a presidential adviser and was seen by many, both within and without the party, as being responsible for restricting access to the President to a small circle. Changes in the composition of government coincided with a perceptible warming of relations with Khartoum. One contentious issue between the two governments was Juba's alleged support for the resistance mounted by the locally recruited SPLM/A-North in Sudan's border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, who had formed a broad Sudan Revolutionary Front with some of the Darfur dissident groups, such as JEM. In June 2013 some 170 SPLA officers, many known for their continued support for the SPLA-North, were dismissed. In August Salva Kiir announced that he would stop aid to the SPLM-North (though he had previously never admitted giving such aid) and signed a security agreement with President Bashir the following September. In November, the terms of the 2012 oil agreement were readjusted in Khartoum's favour. There were also several meetings between the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service and South Sudan's Security Service. Edward Lino, from the contested Abyei area, was removed from his position as head of South Sudan's security.7 The parallel problem within the SPLA is that it had never recovered completely from the split in the 1990s, led by Riek Machar, Lam Akol, and others. During that time the Khartoum government supported various anti-SPLA factions with arms and money. Some of the dissident leaders, such as Riek Machar, Taban Deng Gai, and Lam Akol, returned to the SPLM/A before 2002 and were reincorporated into the party. Riek, a Nuer from Unity, and Lam, a Shilluk from Upper Nile, were both engineers with doctoral degrees and had been advanced in the SPLA hierarchy because of their academic qualifications. Based on the Ethiopian border when the Mengistu regime fell, depriving the SPLA of their major backer and their rear bases, Riek and Lam tried to rally support within the SPLA for the removal of Garang but failed to create a movement beyond the confines of their own command, and eventually allied with Khartoum instead.8 When the prodigals returned Riek was given the number three spot in the SPLM hierarchy, which is why he slid into the position of Vice-President in 2005 when Salva Kiir was elevated to the presidency. Since 2006, and more recently since 2011, most of these Khartoum-backed militias, who were largely recruited from different Nuer groups in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states, were brought back into the SPLA – but incompletely integrated there. Their leaders were promoted, but rank-and-file troops were not absorbed into other units. Throughout the Interim Period there were repeated defections to Khartoum and re-defections back to the SPLA, and often defectors returned with enhanced ranks. Peter Gatdet became known as a serial defector both before and after 2005. Those who never broke away sometimes felt that preferential treatment had been given to those who did, and that rebels were being rewarded for their rebellion.9 The character of the army changed even more with the dismissal of some of the more stalwart veteran SPLA officers in 2013. The most serious threat to South Sudan's security prior to 2013 was the ongoing fighting between mainly armed civilian groups in Jonglei state. This, too, was an unresolved legacy of the war. Jonglei had been a recruiting ground for anti-SPLA militias by Khartoum, especially the of who had a of relations with neighbouring and During the SPLA split of the 1990s, many Nuer civilian groups also armed for fighting the SPLA and more for from their armed The of became for their in the Bor of that year in with of Riek Machar's of the Their derived from the fact that they were not a and were different civilian forces armed throughout the as Riek Machar's forces in a of internal Nuer civil These armed groups were not of the militias as in the and the government's from on was to rather than to them. a of between the and their led to and civilian and an of of against on both Some of the came Khartoum, which supported was by the government in with Peter the of the SPLA 8th now in but the number of was small and armed groups continued to in different of the state. Salva Kiir's to to people from his own community for support within the party was by his of a special within the army from his state of and neighbouring This was by the SPLA but was kept outside the SPLA of and to the President. This move some officers in the army even before the of By December to the President had around Riek Machar and a number of the all members of the SPLM and This was a of as many of the dismissed ministers had never been strong supporters of Riek, and the on December followed the issues already in Adwok They Salva Kiir for the and the the party, in the party and state the Garang loyalists, members into too many to Khartoum in post-independence a army the of and the It was that they to Salva Kiir of the party chairmanship in the but the President There was a between the President and Vice-President on the first of the meeting on and Riek and his the second It was on the that fighting in Juba It is the of fighting in Juba and the defections of mainly Nuer of the SPLA that have led many to this as a tribal war between Dinka and Nuer. This be but is so It is that Salva Kiir's whether in the uniform of the or in of other including the through largely Nuer and both killings and targeted of The government that these were the of troops rebels who fled into the but the reports of targeted continued reports of men in Juba, are too to be of the of in Juba led to revenge killings of Dinka by Nuer in Akobo and The first SPLA to announce its defection to Riek was the 8th led by Peter Gatdet in Jonglei, who his to up with Riek when the fled Juba. of the SPLA that have against the government from reincorporated anti-SPLA militias, and most of the fighting that has has been to the three states – Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile – that were the of fighting between the SPLA and Machar's in the the time there is no Nuer unity. The government control of and Malakal with the aid of loyal Nuer Foreign have largely little the civilian has been involved in the With one are not being or to involved in the fighting in any significant on During the of the fighting in Juba many of the people targeted by the were by their – Dinka Dinka and Nuer to their people from other groups both Nuer and Since then Juba have been and for the in the UNMISS The army might be and the but the people of South Sudan are The one of civilian has been the in Jonglei, armed who the of Bor and In fact no such and the of the term is a by both the government in Juba, calling these groups of armed the South Sudanese of the of the Riek to the the that he is leading a The groups of largely Nuer are not the as the of the a of after the and against in They have of small arms and are able to their but their the were as their in Bor and Malakal were Riek not and other Nuer civilian have urged to and of the One of the of this Nuer against the government is that who has led a Khartoum-backed against Juba, has recently agreed a with the time there is the of the fighting on the ground. The of the Army is already and has been by Sudan, and the in have the of the as a for further The fact that Salva Kiir has been able to on the support of both the SPLA-North and in and the Unity oil fields will be a for Khartoum in its to South Sudan from these and Khartoum's initial support for Juba. for a to the conflict on international actors and a number of other is not In the 1990s, he with Khartoum from the of his rebellion against while to an that his public of and would gain him the support of Western such as the the beginning of this conflict he to oil with Khartoum, in a attempt to their he has been In the 1990s, as he lost control of troops on the ground. In he dismissed the of civilian as while he has civilian deaths as that in war. as in the 1990s, he is to a of Nuer to In the he on his armed fight against the SPLA after it had any of and people within his that they are to an international to with the of civilian deaths will have to be if any peace is to have a of Yet both sides are and leader is to The issues of highlighted by this conflict are not internal to the SPLM, and there is potential for up a for other to be and other groups to involved in the issues that led to the South Sudan the for in South Sudan, such as the as well as groups have been their and to the of the in is the of some of the as a They have from Riek and the by his They have that they will from because they have no forces of their they many of their political these civilian groups of a for the this will it for Riek and his allied commanders to and their
