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Peer-Reviewed Article November 11, 2007

How does neopatrimonialism affect the African state's revenues? The case of tax collection in Zambia

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Published in: The Journal of Modern African Studies
Publisher: Cambridge University Press • South Africa • 0022-278X • 1469-7777
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x0700290x

Abstract

ABSTRACT Following the neopatrimonialism paradigm, it can be hypothesised that in African states informal politics of the rulers infringe on the collection of taxes and in turn reduce state revenue. This article tests this proposition for the case of Zambia. Neopatrimonial continuity in the country is evidenced by three factors: the concentration of political power, the award of personal favours, and the misuse of state resources. Despite this continuity, the revenue performance increased considerably with the creation of the semi-autonomous Zambia Revenue Authority. Donor pressure has been the most important intervening variable accounting for this improvement. Yet, strengthening the collection of central state revenue has been consistent with a neopatrimonial rationale, and may even have fed neopatrimonialism overall, by providing increased resources for particularistic expenditure.

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