Measuring Performance Through Capital Structure: Evidence from Banking Sector of Pakistan
Abstract
Capital structure of the financial institutions and banks determine agency cost of financial sector of theeconomy. In this study we explore the agency cost hypothesis of banking sector of Pakistan usingpanel data of 22 banks for the period 2002 to 2009. We employed the idea of using profit as a measureof efficiency of banks following Berger (2002) and the idea of using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm’sperformance following Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988); Treece et al. (1994). Our study differs fromthe others in terms of methodology of panel data models which provide a better substitute for SUR andsimultaneous equations employed by the other studies. Pooled data results prove agency costhypothesis and the findings are in accordance with those of Pratomo and Ismail (2007) Berger and DiPatti (2002). Size of banks and consumer banking seem to have played significant role in their profitefficiency during the period from 2002 to 2009. Random effects and fixed effects models nevertheless,proved Miller-Modigliani (1958) proposition that capital structure does not affect value of the banks.
