Constitutional provisions and executive succession: Malawi's 2012 transition in comparative perspective

Abstract

Four African leaders died in 2012. This article explores the constellation of factors that together led to a constitutional succession after President Bingu wa Mutharika's death in Malawi, despite plotting by the late President's allies to circumvent the constitution and install their own candidate over Vice-President Joyce Banda. We present data on executive deaths in office since 1961 and executive transfers of power 2010–12 in order to situate the Malawi transition within the broader African context, and draw especially on comparisons to executive successions that followed the death-in-office of presidents in Nigeria (2010) and Zambia (2008). We assert from these cases that constitutional provisions on executive succession are necessary in precipitating peaceful transitions, but also argue that periods of delay indicate that such provisions are insufficient on their own. We contend that presidential death is more likely to lead to transition than presidential incapacity. The Malawian case in particular illustrates how a constitutional transition requires support from key actors, particularly the Cabinet, military leaders, judiciary, civil society, and the independent media. Public rejection of military or authoritarian rule, and the growing precedent for constitutional succession in Africa, are additional drivers of peaceful transitions.