The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis

Abstract

Using political economy analysis, this paper discusses three precipitating factors that were ignited by Kenya's 2007 election, which was too close to call beforehand and highly contested afterwards. These factors were: the gradual loss of the state's monopoly of legitimate force and the consequent diffusion of violence; the deliberate weakening of institutions outside the executive in favour of personalized presidential power, raising questions about the credibility of other institutions to resolve the election on the table rather than in the streets; and a lack of programmatic political parties which gave rise to a winner take all view of parties that were inherently clientist and ethnically driven, something that raised the stakes of winning and gave rise to violence. The paper discusses each of these factors in historical perspective. It explains how and why they arose and what made each so dangerous. It also aims to place what happened in Kenya into a wider framework of understanding by drawing on a broad range of literature in political economy ranging from Max Weber to Douglas North. Of the three factors discussed, the diffusion of violence followed by institutional issues constitute serious challenges. The resilience of both has the potential to undermine Kenya's transition to democracy.