DEMOCRACY UNDER THE GALLAGHER INDEX: WHY ELECTORAL DISPROPORTIONALITY WEAKENS THE EU’S LEGITIMACY AND ITS ECONOMY

Abstract

Between 1979 and 2024, electoral disproportionality in the European Parliament worsened significantly: the average Gallagher Index in the EU rose by 43%, from 6.2 to 8.9. France (12.1) and Germany (4.3) represent two opposite models. This distortion is not merely a democratic issue: it correlates with higher bond spreads, delays in structural reforms, and lower foreign direct investment. However, these effects are mediated by national political culture, electoral timing, and the role of the Council and the Commission. The “French paradox” (stability without legitimacy) shows the limits of a majoritarian system without compensation. Three reforms are simulated: partial proportionality, transnational constituencies, and a harmonized threshold of 3.5%. The article argues for a gradual transition from 2029 onwards, in order to reconcile electoral fairness, economic efficiency, and democratic resilience.